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Introductory remarks 
 
 This is a thoughtful and thought-provoking paper, informative and interesting. I learned a 
lot from reading this and have already passed it on to others. 
 In my comments, I would like to do four things: highlight the major points and the 
rationale for them, raise a few quibbles, put forth some additional issues, and propose a possible 
resolution of a dilemma raised in the paper. 
 But let us first try to be clear about what we are talking about. Professor Pestieau 
characterizes social insurance as being mandatory, universal, and redistributive. I would define it 
slightly differently: “Social insurance is a state-run or state-mandated system that is mandatory 
and universal.” Must it be redistributive? I would say that it may or may not be ex ante in an 
expected value sense. But of course, social insurance will surely be redistributive ex post once 
losses are incurred. 
 
Major conclusions and their rationale 
 
 What should social insurance do? Professor Pestieau’s answer is that social insurance 
should concentrate on fulfilling the role of “social protection.” He reaches the following major 
conclusions: 
1. “Henceforth, one should think of reshaping social protection in the direction of uniform 
transfers to all current beneficiaries of its various components. If this transfer were fixed 
at a decent level, the cost for public finance would already be high, possibly higher than 
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the current one. Individuals with middle or high income could supplement these transfers 
by private insurance programs (presumably without tax advantages”). 
2. “Social protection should progressively abandon its insurance mission and focus on 
universality and uniformity in benefits.” 
3. “Financing should come from general revenue and be totally disconnected from the labor 
market.” 
4. “The real alternative is between guaranteeing to the unemployed, the old, the sick, the 
disabled, and the poor a uniform but sufficient amount of benefits and keeping the current 
system subject to a continuous erosion that leads to increasing pockets of poverty” 
 Let me turn to the rationale he gives for these conclusions, most of which I share, and to a 
few quibbles. 
 He writes: “Social insurance is subject to many of the same incentives problems—moral 
hazard, adverse selection—that lead to private insurance market failures.” The point about 
adverse selection is dubious. Earlier in the paper, Professor Pestieau notes that mandatory social 
insurance can overcome the adverse selection problem. I come back to this below. 
 Professor Pestieau states: “Fiscal competition and economic integration make it more and 
more difficult to maintain ‘generous’ social protection programs.” I should think that in order for 
these factors to make something more and more difficult, they must be growing. Are they? 
Probably economic integration is, but it is not so clear for fiscal competition. I would have 
appreciated more evidence. 
 He claims: “The recent evolution of employment conditions leads to a widening gap 
between social protection program and labor markets.” The point he means to bring out here, I 
think, is that the old model based on the involuntary loss of a long-term job doesn’t hold for very 
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many people. This, however, leaves unanswered the question of what to replace the old model 
with. Also, he is talking here about a change in conditions, but the evidence he presents in the 
text is about levels. 
 He then says: “Recent economic and demographic developments call for increased public 
interventions in the area of redistributive income maintenance.” When I read this, I wondered 
what exactly are these developments. Here is what I think they are: On the economic side, tighter 
government budgets make it more difficult to sustain social insurance programs, while on the 
demographic side, population aging puts pressure on retirement income systems. Anyhow, I 
would have liked to have seen these brought out a bit more clearly. 
 
Some issues to consider 
 
 Many issues arise in designing programs for social insurance and social protection. 
Elsewhere, Olivia Mitchell and I have tried to highlight some of the main decisions that need to 
be made. I would like to put these forward to this distinguished group of insurance specialists. 
 First, the objective needs to be clearly stated. The presumed objective of these programs, 
as we see it, is to ensure adequate consumption. 
 Next, it is necessary to determine the standard of adequacy. Is the goal absolute adequacy 
(for instance, in relation to a national poverty line), or is it relative adequacy (relative to one’s 
level of consumption prior to the precipitating event)? This choice gets to the heart of the 
insurance-protection decision, which Professor Pestieau has put forth so clearly. 
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 The decision also must be made about whom to insure or compensate: the poor, the 
vulnerable, or the losers? They are not the same people. The poor are often chronically poor, 
while the biggest losers may well be the nonpoor or even the quite well-to-do. 
 Different programs are appropriate for these different groups. The poor have need for 
basic social protection. Social assistance programs aim to provide this. For the vulnerable, the 
need is for insurance. For example, old-age annuities deal with the problem of economic 
insecurity caused by outliving one’s working years, given that the length of life is uncertain. 
Sound insurance principles can be used to decide such questions as whether to make these 
programs public or private and whether they should be mandatory or optional. As for the losers, 
they are frequently targeted in order to “buy” their support—for example, for World Bank-IMF 
structural adjustment programs. These losers (for example, laid-off civil servants) are often the 
least-deserving recipients of scarce public funds. 
 This raises the question of the fiscal tradeoff. How should scarce resources be divided 
among the poor, the vulnerable, and the losers? This decision should be made explicitly. 
Unfortunately, it often is made by default. 
 
A possible resolution 
 
 Is there a way out of the insurance-protection dilemma? Let me raise one possibility. 
 A system could be created that is both fully-funded and redistributive. It could be fully 
funded in the sense that for a particular group of insureds (such as a birth cohort) the present 
value of expected benefits (PVEB) can equal the present value of expected contributions 
(PVEC). Yet by offering a higher PVEB/PVEC ratio for target groups such as the poor and those 
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born with certain defects, the program could also be redistributive. The U.S. social security 
system is redistributive in precisely this sense. Of course, to overcome adverse selection, such a 
system would have to be mandatory. Hence, it would be social insurance, but it need not be state 
run. It could be state mandated, allowing private insurance companies to handle groups of 
people on an actuarial basis while still redistributing within a group—for instance, by using 
unisex mortality tables. 
 Thus, I conclude that we do not yet need to abandon the insurance mission of social 
insurance programs. For as long as people turn to the state for help when they are poor, old, or 
sick, the state may require that they buy insurance against at least some of these risks. In so 
doing, the state would further establish its credibility and commitment to helping those in need—
a point dealt with persuasively by Professor Pestieau in his text. 
 Such a system might provide both genuine protection and valuable insurance. For these 
reasons, mandatory redistributive social insurance systems might be worth considering further. 
